The Action Bias in American Law:
Internet Jurisdiction and the Triumph of Zippo Dot Com
by
Richard K. Greenstein*

Introduction
American law reflects the stories we tell ourselves about who we are as
a nation. To illustrate the effect of America’s stories on the law, I identify and
describe in this essay a particular characteristic of American law: an “action
bias” – a propensity to bestow disproportionately greater legal significance
upon affirmative acts than on failures to act – and I argue that this bias
reflects, in turn, a powerful myth at the core of the self-image of the United
States, a myth I call the “Immigrant’s Tale.”
I will begin with a particular and remarkable instance of the action
bias by considering the career of an exceedingly important, albeit somewhat
obscure federal district court decision: Zippo Manufacturing Company v.
Zippo Dot Com,1 the case that formulated the framework now used almost
universally in the determination of personal jurisdiction in Internet cases.
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Of course, the development of the Internet has challenged the law as
new technologies typically do. Usually the problem iswhether to revise old
legal doctrines in order to deal more adequately with the new reality or to
develop specially tailored new doctrines. With the Internet, however, this
usual problem intersects with a vigorous debate over whether the Internet is
simply a new tool for achieving old objectives in our familiar world or a new
and strange world altogether.2 For if it is the latter, questions about what the
law should look like are complicated by questions such as whether the idea of
law even makes sense in cyberspace.
One important piece of this puzzle was the issue of how to determine
personal jurisdiction in cases involving the Internet. I say “was” because this
question has largely been resolved, and its resolution was swift and decisive.
In the mid-1990’s the doctrinal question seemed up for grabs, with competing
tests vying for dominance in the marketplace of judicial ideas. In short order,
however, one particular framework – that announced in Zippo Dot Com –
rapidly achieved preeminence. On the face of it, this is surprising since the
approach had no obvious logical or policy advantage over its competitors. In
this essay I want to try to understand the quick and far reaching triumph of
Zippo Dot Com. Why did that happen, and what does it mean?

2E.g.,

compare David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996), with Jack Goldsmith,
Against Cyberanarchy, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475 (1998).
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By 1996, the year before Zippo Dot Com was decided, issues regarding
the proper test for personal jurisdiction in Internet cases were being raised
with increasing frequency. The following hypothetical problem illustrates
what the debate was about:
Jack maintains a personal site on the World Wide Web from his
home computer in New York City. The site includes various family
photographs, some of Jack’s poetry, several political diatribes, and a
section entitled “X-Girlfriends,” in which he discusses various women
he has been involved with. Jack’s Web site can be visited by anyone in
the world with access to the Internet.
One of Jack’s former girlfriends is Brie, whom Jack dated when
they were both attending college in New York. After graduation, Brie
moved several times to various places and is currently living in Fargo,
North Dakota, where she operates a small business. Jack and Brie
have not been in contact with one another since her move; Jack does
not know that Brie currently lives in North Dakota; and Jack has
neither traveled to North Dakota nor had dealings with anyone in that
state.
One day Brie received a phone call from her friend Colby. Colby
also lives and works in Fargo. Bored at her job that afternoon, Colby
had “Googled” Brie’s name on her office computer and followed various
links that took her to Jack’s Web site. When Colby read his “X
-
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Girlfriends” entries, she discovered that Jack had made several
scandalous assertions about Brie’s personal life. When Brie heard from
Colby about the nature of these assertions, she visitedJack ’s Web site
herself, read the relevant entries, and thereupon contacted a lawyer,
who filed a defamation suit against Jack in a North Dakota state court.
The court must decide whether it can assert personal jurisdiction
under a North Dakota statute that authorizes the exercise of long-arm
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
The starting place for the court’s inquiry, of course, is the “minimum
contacts” test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,3 which famously
announced that a state court may constitutionally assert long-arm
jurisdiction over a party to a dispute only if that party has “certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”4 In a series of
cases adding nuance to this doctrine, the Supreme Court clarified that the
contacts in question are those that show that the party has“ purposefully
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”5 and that the party
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326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
5 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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“should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”6 So has Jack
“purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within
[North Dakota]”? Should he “reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there”?
What is interesting about Jack’s case is that while he did not direct his
Internet activities specifically toward North Dakota, he undoubtedly
understood that his Web page could be accessed from any place, and it was in
North Dakota that his remarks about Brie had their defamatory effect. Is this
enough to subject Jack to the jurisdiction of a North Dakota court?
Within a nine-month span during 1996-1997, two federal district
courts formulated distinct approaches to jurisdiction in cases involving
Internet activities that framed the debate for virtually all succeeding cases
throughout the country. The analyses proposed by Inset Systems, Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc.7 and Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com8
would likely generate opposite results in Brie’s suit against Jack. In brief,
Inset Systems supports jurisdiction on the ground that Jack’s Web page was
“designed to communicate with people . . . in every state;” by contrast, Zippo
Dot Com opposes jurisdiction on the ground that Jack’s activities are
essentially “passive” within the territory of North Dakota, depending on
individuals within that state to take the initiative to access his site.
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In Section I of this essay, I will examine these competing approaches in
more detail, but my main concern in that Section is to chronicle the rapid
emergence of the test formulated in Zippo Dot Com as the overwhelmingly
dominant framework now used by American courts. That is, my interest is
not to take sides in the now largely concluded debate; as I expect to
demonstrate, each approach has important and evident virtues. Rather, I am
interested in understanding why Zippo Dot Com triumphed so quickly and
decisively. Precisely because each approach has its virtues, one might have
anticipated a long struggle among various courts – with some aligning with
Inset System, some with Zippo Dot Com, and some developing a hybrid as the
analytical framework of choice for determining jurisdiction in Internet cases.
So the question I want to ask is, Why did the Zippo Dot Com test achieved
such a swift and nearly universal appeal over its competitor, the Inset
Systems test?
To get at this question, I will develop two ideas. In Section III will
describe an “action bias” in American law; again, this is the propensity of
American legal doctrine to bestow disproportionately greater legal
significance to affirmative acts than to failures to act. In Section III, I will
describe a traditional story, the “Immigrant’s Tale,” that, with several
important variations, has become central to the dominant conception of what
defines the United States. Reversing directions, I will argue in Section IV
that the law’s action bias is understandable in terms of the national self-
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conception illustrated by the Immigrant’s Tale, and in Section V that the test
for personal jurisdiction formulated in Zippo Dot Com is understandable as a
particular instantiation of the action bias and, ultimately, of the values
exemplified in the Immigrant’s Tale.
In developing this analysis, I will focus largely on the due process
dimension of personal jurisdiction analysis. That seems the obvious approach
since the judicial treatment of the constitutional parameters of personal
jurisdiction post-Pennoyer v. Neff9 has been articulated exclusively in due
process terms. Still, it bears remembering that any extraterritorial projection
of state power over individuals will raise issues both of fairness toward those
individual and of comity toward the other states that have interests in the
dispute (especially the states in which the individuals are physically located
or are domiciled). The assertion of long-arm jurisdiction is no exception.10
Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court’s claim that modern
personal jurisdiction cases are concerned exclusively with due process and
not with the relationship among states,11 federalism continues to play a
significant role in personal jurisdiction analysis.12 Consequently, the exercise
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95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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of long-arm jurisdiction over Jack raises both due process issues regarding
the fairness of subjecting Jack to the authority of a North Dakota court in
that particular state and federalism issues regarding the proper respect owed
New York by North Dakota. So while the discussion in th
is essay will
emphasize the due process dimension of the problem, Section VI offers a
“Postscript” that relates a second story, the “Sovereign’s Tale,” and through
that story suggests how the Zippo Dot Com test also resonates with our
traditional understanding of the federalism dimension of personal
jurisdiction doctrine.
In sum, my thesis is a broad one: I want to suggest, by examining the
particular example of personal jurisdiction in Internet activity cases, that the
development of legal doctrine through judicial decisions reflects the stories
we tell ourselves about who we are as a people and what we stand for as a
culture. This thesis has direct implications for an important practical
question: What makes a legal argument persuasive? Lawyers often treat
legal argumentation as being overtly about the techniques of interpreting
precedent and legislation, about conflicts among competing public polices,
and perhaps about clashes among moral values. Latent determinants of a
successful argument might include the personal preferences of individual
judges, the personal goals of individual legislators, legislative capture by
interest groups, the current political atmosphere, and so forth.

interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies”).
8

What I want to add to this list is the suggestion that the success of a
legal argument may have much to do with whether that argument resonates
with pervasive and deeply held understandings of what kind of community
we are and wish to be. Like the myths of allcultures , our stories express that
collective self-understanding. And like the myths of all cultures, our stories
infiltrate and shape our norms and our social and political institutions,
including law. The Immigrant’s and Sovereign’s Tales are among th
e stories
we tell ourselves as a culture; the action and territory biases in American law
are their manifestations; and the triumph ofone particular legal argument –
Zippo Dot Com’s “sliding scale” test – is a consequence.

I
The Triumph of Zippo Dot Com (Part 1)
Central to appreciating the jurisdictional issue in the hypothetical
litigation between Brie and Jack is aquestion that has puzzled courts over
the years: whether a bad effect within a geographic location is itself sufficient
to satisfy the “minimum contacts” test. In the defamation context, the United
States Supreme Court held in Calder v. Jones13 that the Florida authors (a
reporter and his editor) of an allegedly libelous article published in a
nationally circulated newspaper could be sued in California where the victim
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465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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of the libel lived and worked. Unlike the hypothetical Jack, the Calder
defendants knew that the victim resided there. The Court found that
California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered.
Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on
the “effects” of their Florida conduct in California.14
But the Court was clearly influenced by more than just the location of the
“effects.” It went on to observe that defendants wrote and edited an article
that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon
respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt
by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which
the [publication] has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances,
petitioners must "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there" to
answer for the truth of the statements made in their article. 15
Consequently, the Court concluded,
In this case, petitioners are primary participants in an alleged
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and
jurisdiction over them is proper on that basis.16
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Id. at 788-789.
Id. at 789-790 (emphasis added). See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770 (1984)(state where allegedly libelous magazine article circulated can
assert jurisdiction even though plaintiff lives elsewhere when tort has
occurred in forum state and defendant has “continuously and deliberately
exploited the [forum] market”)
16 Id. at 790 (emphasis added).
15
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While Jack’s Web site generated a tortious effect in North Dakota, it is
difficult to say that the defamation was “intentionally directed at a [North
Dakota] resident” in the Calder sense. Jack’s ignorance of Brie’s North
Dakota residence and his ignorance of who specifically was accessing his Web
page make his conduct more analogous to a manufacturer who places his
product in the “stream of commerce,” only to have it cause injury in some
forum downstream. Here, the Supreme Court’s signals have been ambiguous.
In World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,17 the Court cited with
apparent approval18 the Supreme Court of Illinois’s decision in Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,19 holding an Ohio
manufacturer of valves that were ultimately integrated into boilers made by
a Pennsylvania company liable for injuries caused by a defective valve to an
Illinois purchaser of one of the boilers. The requisite minimum contacts were
satisfied in Gray by the valve manufacturer’s knowledge that the boilers
incorporating its valves were being sold nation-wide. Accordingly, the valve
manufacturer could expect that its product would find its way to Illinois and
would benefit from that fact. In Asahi Matal Industries20 the Court split on
this issue. A four-Justice plurality took the position that “placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more,” was insufficient to
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444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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19 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
20 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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constitute activity “purposefully directed toward the forum State”;21 four
other Justices approved generally the “stream of commerce” basis for
personal jurisdiction, but found the assertion of jurisdiction in the instant
case unfair for other reasons.22
Again, the terms for applying these principles to Internet activity were
set by a pair of federal district court cases decided in the mid-1990’s. In April
1996, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut decided
Inset Systems. The claim in that case was that the Massachusetts defendant’s
internet domain address (“INSET.COM”) infringed on the Connecticut
plaintiff’s trademark. Defendant had no physical presence in Connecticut and
did not conduct regular business there; accordingly, defendant argued that
the minimum contacts needed to support jurisdiction in a Connecticut court
were lacking. In response, the court observed that advertising on the Internet
is
designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every
state. Advertisement on the Internet can reach as many as 10,000
Internet users within Connecticut alone. Further, once posted on the
Internet, unlike television and radio advertising, the advertisement is
available continuously to any Internet user. ISI [Instruction Set, Inc.]

21

Id. at 112.
Id. at 116-21 (Brennan, J. concurring). The ninth concurring Justice took
no position on the “stream of commerce” question. Id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J.
concurring).
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has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business within Connecticut.
The court concludes that since ISI purposefully directed its
advertising activities toward this state on a continuing basis since
March, 1995, it could reasonably anticipate the possibility of being
hailed into court here.23
The analogy with the “stream of commerce” theory used in Gray is
straightforward. If one intentionally launches a harm-producing “product,”
knowing and benefiting from that fact that it can find its way into any state,
there is no unfairness in holding that individual accountable in the state
where the harm occurs. Accordingly, since Jack’s Web page was “designed to
communicate with people . . . in every state” and since “once posted on the
Internet [it was] available continuously to any Internet user,” the Inset
Systems approach suggests that Jack may well have the requisite minimum
contacts with North Dakota for that state’s court to assert jurisdiction over
him.
The case for the Inset Systems approach, with its stream-of-commerce
resonance, seems especially powerful in light of the Internet’s peculiar
characteristics. Traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine is fundamentally
tied to territorial considerations.24 However, a pervasive characteristic of
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Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
See infra Section VI.
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Internet activity is territorial indeterminacy.25 Like conversations via cell
phone, individuals can communicate over the Internet without having any
idea or any means of determining where each participant is located in space.
By contrast, communication using land-line telephones, mail, telegraph, etc.
substantially depend upon the recipient of the communication being at a
particular, identifiable place.
Similarly, when Internet users access Web sites, it is unclear just
where those pages “are.” Jack’s Web page is presumably stored on the server
of some Internet Service Provider but where that server is located may be
unknown not only to Brie and Colby, but even to Jack. Moreover, the precise
electronic path that connects Brie to Jack’s Web page is determined ad hoc by
the architecture of Internet.26
Thus, at the moment when Brie is defamed by the reading of Jack’s “XGirlfriends” page, the only readily determinable geographic element of that
defamation is the location of the reader – that is, the location of the
defamatory effect. Since Jack is likely uninvolved in the process when his
Web page is accessed, he is in a position analogous to the valve manufacturer
in Gray. Having shipped the defective valves to the boiler producer, who
subsequently determined the subsequent distribution of the boilers, the valve
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See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 2. But see, Goldsmith, supra note 2.
HowStuffWorks.com, How Routers Work (visited March 9, 2006)
<http://computer.howstuffworks.com/router.htm>.
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manuracturer lost control over whether and when its valves would cause
“effects” in any particular state.
It is, therefore, not accidental that the approach of Inset Systems
resonates so strongly with stream-of-commerce theory, as used in cases like
Gray. In an important sense, that theory is just the further working out of a
point made by the Supreme Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,27
when it observed that the “nationalization of commerce,” coupled with new
transportation and communication technology, had reduced the importance of
state borders for the purpose of determining personal jurisdiction in
commercial cases.28 This idea presaged the progressive irrelevancy of
territory in jurisdictional analysis, culminating in the analysis used Inset
Systems. And while Brie’s case against Jack is not commercial, McGee ‘s core
insight of McGee applies: The significance of territory is a relic of an era when
human interactions and government regulation of human interactions were
largely local. In an era when actors like Jack can harm others without either
party knowing where the other is located, tying a court’s authority to
adjudicate the dispute to whether Jack had intentionally directed his harmful
conduct toward a particular geographic place might seem, to put it
charitably, a little quaint.
And yet, nine months after Inset Systems, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania decided Zippo Dot Com.
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355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Id. at 222-23; see Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-251.
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Another trademark infringement case,the court saw the application of the
“minimum contacts” test to Internet activity as follows:
[O]ur review of the available cases and materials reveals that the
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is
directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity
that an entity conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale is
consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction principles. At one
end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does
business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with
residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal
jurisdiction is proper. . . . At the opposite end are situations where a
defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site
which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web
site that does little more than make information available to those who
are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise personal jurisdiction.
. . . The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a
user can exchange information with the host computer. In these
cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level
of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information
that occurs on the Web site.29
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Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (citations omitted).
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Applying this “sliding scale,” the court found that defendant’s activities
were sufficiently interactive in nature (customers accessing its Web site could
not only obtain information, but could exchange data and apply for services
with the company) to establish in conjunction with otheractivities the
requisite minimum contacts. In the process, the court characterized Inset
Systems as representing “the outer limits of the exercise of personal
jurisdiction based on the Internet,” implying that the Web site involved in
Inset Systems fell decidedly toward the “passive” end of the “sliding scale,”
where we would expect also to find Jack’s personal Web page. Accordingly, if
“the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the Web site,” we might well expect the “sliding scale” test to
protect Jack from being haled before a North Dakota court.
Rather than taking the Inset Systems approach and reconceiving
personal jurisdiction doctrine to reflect the technological realities of the
Internet, Zippo Dot Com reflects the belief that jurisdiction doctrine from the
pre-Internet era can be employed in a way that does justice to that reality.
Accordingly, Zippo Dot Com’s “sliding scale” framework carries forward the
concern in Burger King for determining whether “contacts proximately result
from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection'
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with the forum State.”30 It recalls the Hanson Court’s framing of the
question: Did defendant “purposefully avail[ himself] of the privilege of
conducting activities in the within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.” As another court that adopted the
“sliding scale” test put it, the issue from this point of view is whether there
has been an “express aiming at the forum state”31
My purpose in detailing the analyses in Inset Systems and Zippo Dot
Com is simply to suggest that these two cases represent different, but
altogether plausible and defensible understandings of International Shoe’s
“minimum contacts” doctrine as applied to legal disputes associated with socalled passive Web sites like Jack’s. Accordingly, there are policy reasons for
favoring either approach over the other – reasons discussed by the various
courts that have explicitly chosen between the competing analyses32 and by
the various scholars who have explored the ins and outs of personal
jurisdiction doctrine as applied to internet activity.33
And so, one might have expected an extensive struggle between these
two analytical frameworks in the marketplace of judicial ideas – a struggle
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Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (emphasis in original), quoted in Zippo Dot
Com, 952 F. Supp at 1123.
31 Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 12 (Cal. 2002).
32 E.g., Barrett v. Catacomb Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 724-27 (E.D. Pa.
1999); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416-19 (9th Cir. 1997);
see, Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 6-10.
33 E.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 311, 412-20 (2002); Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward
Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1345,
1360-79 (2001).
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that might have been won by either approach. But there was little struggle.
In short order, the “sliding scale” test achieved utter dominance. Today it is
difficult to find a court that uses the Inset Systems analysis. Even recent
decisions of Connecticut’s federal District Court, while not overruling Inset
Systems, have tended to distinguish or soften its approach.34
Yet, even as courts succumbed to the seemingly irresistible appeal of
Zippo Dot Com, there was some a certain resignation, even embarrassment,
at this capitulation. In an especially thoughtful opinion, the Fourth Circuit
recognized that the rejected approach of Inset Systems in fact made
considerable sense. Its observations are worth quoting at length:
Applying the traditional due process principles governing a
State's jurisdiction over persons outside of the State based on Internet
activity requires some adaptation of those principles because the
Internet is omnipresent--when a person places information on the
Internet, he can communicate with persons in virtually every
jurisdiction. If we were to conclude as a general principle that a
person's act of placing information on the Internet subjects that person
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American Wholesalers Underwriting, Ltd. v. American Wholesale
Insurance Group, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 247 (D. Conn. 2004)(distinguishes Inset
Systems); Divicino v. Polaris Industries,129 F.Supp.2d 425 (D. Conn.
2001)(softens Inset Systems approach); Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F.Supp.2d
104 (D. Conn. 1998)(distinguishes Inset Systems); E-Data Corp. v.
Micropatent Corp., 989 F.Supp. 173 (D. Conn.1997)(distinguishes Inset
Systems); Cody v. Ward, 954 F.Supp. 43 (D.Conn. 1997)(distinguishes Inset
Systems). But see, Pavia v. Club Med, Inc., 1998 WL 229912 (D. Conn. March
30, 1998)(follows Inset Systems).
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to personal jurisdiction in each State in which the information is
accessed, then the defense of personal jurisdiction, in the sense that a
State has geographically limited judicial power, would no longer exist.
The person placing information on the Internet would be subject to
personal jurisdiction in every State.
But under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, despite
advances in technology, State judicial power over persons appears to
remain limited to persons within the State's boundaries and to those
persons outside of the State who have minimum contacts with the
State such that the State's exercise of judicial power over the person
would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
See Hanson [v. Denckla], 357 U.S. at 250-51, 78 S.Ct. 1228 (noting that
“it is a mistake to assume that [the technological] trend heralds the
demise of all restrictions”). But even under the limitations articulated
in International Shoe and retained by Hanson, the argument could still
be made that the Internet's electronic signals are surrogates for the
person and that Internet users conceptually enter a State to the extent
that they send their electronic signals into the State, establishing
those minimum contacts sufficient to subject the sending person to
personal jurisdiction in the State where the signals are received.
Under this argument, the electronic transmissions “symbolize those
activities ... within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to
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satisfy the demands of due process.” Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17, 66
S.Ct. 154. But if that broad interpretation of minimum contacts were
adopted, State jurisdiction over persons would be universal, and
notions of limited State sovereignty and personal jurisdiction would be
eviscerated.
In view of the traditional relationship among the States and
their relationship to a national government with its nationwide
judicial authority, it would be difficult to accept a structural
arrangement in which each State has unlimited judicial power over
every citizen in each other State who uses the Internet. That thought
certainly would have been considered outrageous in the past when
interconnections were made only by telephones. See, e.g., Stover[ v.
O'Connell Assocs., Inc.], 84 F.3d [132 (4th Cir. 1996),]at 137 (finding a
defendant's “occasional telephonic requests for information from
Maryland-based investigation services” to be insufficient to subject the
defendant to personal jurisdiction in a Maryland court). But now,
even though the medium is still often a telephone wire, the breadth
and frequency of electronic contacts through computers has resulted in
billions of interstate connections and millions of interstate transactions
entered into solely through the vehicle of the Internet. The
convergence of commerce and technology thus tends to push the
analysis to include a "stream-of-commerce" concept, under which each
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person who puts an article into commerce is held to anticipate suit in
any jurisdiction where the stream takes the article. But the “streamof-commerce” concept, although considered, has never been adopted by
the Supreme Court as the controlling principle for defining the reach of
a State's judicial power. See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92
(1987).35
There is a defensive tone in the Fourth Circuit’s argument – a sense of
leaning against the wind, resisting the obvious implications of a technology
that threatens to render highly problematic, if not obsolete, the geographic
limitations of traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine – implications acted
on by the court in Inset Systems.
My question then is, why the rapid and overwhelming triumph
of Zippo Dot Com.?36 It’s eventual success might be understood as an
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ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712-13
(2002).
36 Some might maintain that this characterization as, at best, an
exaggeration. Indeed, Michael Geist detected a movement away from the
Zippos Dot Com test, beginning in the latter part of 1999, and by 2002, he
argued,
Numerous judgments reflect that courts in the United States moved
toward a broader, effects-based approach when deciding whether or not
to assert jurisdiction in the Internet context. Under this new approach,
rather than examining the specific characteristics of a website and its
potential impact, courts focused their analysis on the actual effects
that the website had in the jurisdiction. Indeed, courts are now relying
increasingly on the effects doctrine established by the United States
Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones.
22

instance of conservative allegiance to a venerable, if somewhat musty
analysis from the doctrine’s past, or it might be rationalized in
pragmatic terms.37
However, neither of these explanations accounts for the speed of Zippo
Dot Com’s triumph. I will argue that the overwhelming appeal of Zippo Dot
Com’s interactive-passive distinction lies significantly in its resonance with a
pervasive “action bias” in American law: the propensity of American legal

Geist, supra note 33, at 1371-72. I have suggested in the text that the
doctrine of Calder v. Jones in fact anticipates the Zippo Dot Com test.
However, even more to the point of Geist’s concern, most of the cases he
identifies as distancing themselves from theZippo Dot Com analysis
nevertheless invoke that framework and explain how the particular facts
under consideration fit into it. As an example, the case that Geist points to as
especially critical of Zippo Dot Com, Millenium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millenium
Music, LP, 33 F. Supp.2d 907 (1999), still makes use of the Zippo Dot Com
analysis and criticizes the approach of Inset Systems because it lacks “the
principle that a defendant must “purposefully direct” its activities at or take
‘deliberate action’ in or create ‘substantial connection’ with the forum state so
as to provide ‘fair warning’ that such activities may subject defendant to
jurisdiction in a distant forum,” id., at 922, which raises almost exactly the
point being explored in this essay.
Perhaps most telling, in the five years since the appearance of Geist’s article,
courts have continued to invoke the Zippo Dot Com framework. Indeed, in
just the first two months of 2006, at least three federal and state appellate
courts did so. See, Inc. v. Imago Eyewear Pty, Ltd., Slip Copy, 2006 WL
348148 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2006); Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 2006 WL
306645 (Utah Feb 10, 2006); Karstetter v. Voss, 2006 WL 279377 (Tex.Ct.
App.Feb 07, 2006).
37 See, e.g., Geist, supra note 33, at 1370 (“Error! Main Document
Only.The widespread approval for the Zippo test should come as little
surprise. The uncertainty created by the Internet jurisdiction issue led to a
strong desire for a workable solution that provided a fair balance between the
fear of a lawless Internet and one burdened by over-regulation. The Zippo
test seemed the best available alternative. This is particularly true in light of
the Inset line of cases, which illustrated that the alternative might well be
the application of jurisdiction by any court, anywhere.”)
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doctrine to assign legal duties as the consequences of active, as opposed to
passive, behavior. The remainder of this essay will define and give examples
of this action bias, offer a hypothesis to explain the action bias, and argue
that the “sliding scale” test of Zippo Dot Com is constructed out of the basic
elements preferred by the action bias.

II
The Action Bias in American Law (Part 1)
Zippo Dot Com links the establishment of minimum contacts to
affirmative action. All Internet Web sites that are accessed by individuals
operating their computers in the forum state establish contacts with the
forum by virtue of such access. In this sense, Jack has contacts with North
Dakota when his defamatory writings are read by Colbyand Brie. However,
the “sliding scale” analysis of Zippo Dot Com suggests that these contacts
might be insufficient for establishing the personal jurisdiction of a North
Dakota court because Jack’s Web site is “passive.” By contrast, interactive
Web sites do create legally sufficient contacts.
This differential treatment of interactive and passive Internet activity
is consistent with an enormous number of doctrines throughout the law that
similarly predicate legal obligations on active rather than to passive
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conduct.38 Legal duties in American law are generally duties that impose
limits on action or duties that do not come into being until one has acted. We
see this again and again in fields as diverse as the law of crimes, torts,
contracts, and federal income taxation.
Consider, for example, criminal law. § 2.01 of the Model Penal Code
reflects prevailing doctrine regarding criminal liability for active versus
passive behavior:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on
conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an
act of which he is physically capable.
. . .
(3) Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an
omission unaccompanied by action unless:
(a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining
the offense; or

38

The bias is less pronounced with respect to rights. Many important rights
protect passive activity. For example, various constitutional rights pertaining
to the rights of persons when confronted with a police investigation include
the and extensive right not to cooperate with police searches and the right to
not be forced to incriminate oneself. To some degree, this protection of
passivity through the allocation of rights can be seen as the correlative of the
law’s imposition of duties for active conduct. More generally, however, the
hypothesis for the action bias that will be developed in the text applies to the
creation of legal obligations, rather than the designation of legal rights.
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(b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by
law.39
The gist of this provision is that criminal liability presumptively
attaches only to active behavior that violates declared standards of conduct;
passive behavior is presumptively insulated from liability. Only when an
affirmative duty to act is expressly imposed by law can the failure to act lead
to criminal guilt. Thus, the failure to file an income tax return or (for males)
the failure to register with the Selective Service are crimes because of laws
expressly requiring these actions.
Situations governed by § 2.01(3)(b) are especially revealing in this
regard. Classic examples involve homicide. If I fail to rescue an unconscious
eleven-year-old stranger from a shallow pool of water, I am presumptively not
criminally liable when she subsequently drowns.40 On the other hand, if the
unconscious child is my eleven-year-old daughter, I would be liable for her
death. The difference is that the law has “otherwise imposed” on me a duty of
care with respect to my daughter, whereas it has not done so for the stranger.
By contrast, if I act affirmatively to kill another – by shooting, stabbing,
poisoning, drowning, etc – it does not matter whether the victim is a stranger
or my daughter.

39

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1), (3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
It should be noted that there is no problem with causation is such a case.
The Model Penal Code’s definition of causation and requirements of
proximity between conduct and result are satisfied in this hypothetical
problem. See, id., § 2.03(1)(a), (3)(b).
40
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The duties “otherwise imposed” that can support criminal liability for
passively causing death tend to be triggered by affirmative action. The four
traditional sources of such duties – statute, contract, status, and the taking of
affirmative steps to assist41 – usually require some sort of affirmative act.
Thus, if I had affirmatively acted to adopt the eleven-year-old stranger, I
would have then through that action acquired legal obligations toward her,
which I would violate if I refused to rescue her from the shallow pool.
A less preposterous and increasingly frequent instance of this
distinction has to do with euthanasia. “Active euthanasia” (i.e., taking
affirmative action to kill someone who is suffering) subjects the actor to
possible prosecution; by contrast, “passive euthanasia” (e.g., terminating life
support such as a ventilator) does not.42 However, the analysis becomes much
more complicated if one acts affirmatively to establish a special, legal dutyimposing relationship with the suffering individual (for instance, by becoming
his doctor).43 Again, the law prohibiting homicide applies presumptively to
affirmative killing behavior. It presumptively does not apply to passive
killing behavior.
Even when passive behavior is criminalized, the penalty may be less
severe than its active counterpart. Thus, the act of filing a false tax return is
punished as a federal felony. By contrast, the failure to file a tax return

41

E.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
E.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006 (1983).
43 See, e.g., id. at 1017-19.
42
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altogether is a misdemeanor even though the burden on the government’s
collection of owed taxes is arguably more burdened by an intentional failure
to file than by an intentionally inaccurate filing.44
Similar differential treatment occurs in torts and contracts. For
example, tort liability is imposed for affirmatively inflicting harm, but often
there is none for passively causing harm – for instance, failing to rescue.45
The law of fraud and misrepresentation in both torts and contracts has
developed from a basic distinction between affirmative lies – say, about the
condition of goods offered for sale – which are actionable, and the failure to
disclose the true condition of goods, which generally is not.46 While these
developments have generated certain exceptions that impose an affirmative
duty to speak, they nevertheless leave the presumptive permissibility of
silence in place.
Interesting examples of this propensity to allocate disproportionate
legal obligations to affirmative action comes from the federal taxation of
wealth. Generally speaking, active acquisition of wealth is taxed at higher

44

Compare I.R.C. § 7203 (failure to file a return is a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to 1 year), with id. § 7206
(willful filing of a false return is a felony punishable by a fine of up to
$100,000 and imprisonment of up to 3 years). I thank Alice Abreu for this
example.
45 Christopher H. White, Note & Comment, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished:
The Case for Reform of the Rescue Doctrine, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 507, 510-19
(2002).
46 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (1981), with id. §
161. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1965), with id. § 551. I
thank Eleanor Myers for these examples.
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rates than passive acquisition. Thus, earned income is taxed, but gifts and
inherited wealth are largely untaxed.47 Stock dividends, which are not
themselves the product of action, but are derived from the action of acquiring
ownership shares in a corporation, are taxed but at a substantially lower rate
than is earned income.48
All of these examples illustrate the tendency of the action bias to
impose legal duties as a consequence of action and, conversely, to immunize
passive conduct from legal obligation even when that passivity generates
effects similar to those caused by action. In this sense, the “sliding scale” test
of Zippo Dot Com reflects the action bias. Causing bad effects in the forum
state through an interactive Web site will generate sufficient contacts to
support the obligation to answer for those effects in the forum’s courts – that
is, to support the forum’s assertion of personal jurisdiction. Causing the same
bad effects through a passive site will likely not generate the requisite
minimum contacts.
Of course, there is no intrinsic property of law that demands the action
bias. As is well known, continental Europe has a long tradition of imposing
legal liability for harm-causing inaction.49 So what accounts for this action
bias in American law?

47

I.R.C. § 102 (excluding gifts and inheritances from income).
I.R.C. § 1(h). I thank Alice Abreu for both of the examples in this
paragraph.
49 See, e.g., White, supra note 45, at 510 n.16. (“Duty to rescue laws are
longstanding in many European nations. Portugal adopted the first such long
48
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III
The Immigrant’s Tale
I have argued elsewhere that the inevitable choices that must be made
in the shaping of a community’s legal doctrine define the character of that
community.50 Furthermore, I have suggested that in making those choices
about law, it is important for a community to maintain at least a rough
continuity with the choices made in the past.51 Also linked to the care and
maintenance of a community’s self-definitions are its myths, the stories that
members of the community tell themselves about their past.52 And many of
the stories that are part and parcel of the self-identity of the United States53

in 1867.The Netherlands, Finland, and Italy all enacted similar legislation in
the nineteenth century, and most of the other countries of continental Europe
did so in the early to middle twentieth century.”)
50 Richard K. Greenstein, The Three Faces of ORPP: Value Clashes in the
Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 95 (1993).
51 Richard K. Greenstein, Why the Rule of Law? 66 LA. L. REV. 63 (2005).
52 See, e.g., RICHARD HUGHES, MYTHS AMERICA LIVES BY (2003); LAUREL T.
ULRICH, THE AGE OF HOMESPUN: OBJECTS AND STORIES IN THE CREATION OF AN
AMERICAN MYTH (2001).
53 I do not mean to suggest, of course, that there is a simple American selfidentity or that all members of the American polity share a single
understanding of what the United States is “about.” I do mean to suggest
that there is a traditional and even dominant understanding of the nation’s
history and character that is transmitted officially (through public education
and other governmental activities) and informally through routine social
interactions.
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narrate the adventures of a stock character,54 whom I will call the
Immigrant.
The basic story of the Immigrant’s Tale is that of leaving an old home
to come to a new home. In the traditional version of this story, the new home
is America, and the reasons for coming to America are diverse. They include
flight from poverty or persecution, but also more affirmative desires for a
better life and for adventure.55

54

The use of “stock stories” as a tool for legal analysis was first suggested by
Gerald Lopez in 1984:
Human beings think about social interaction in story form. We see and
understand the world through "stock stories." These stories help us
interpret the everyday world with limited information and help us
make choices about asserting our own needs and responding to other
people. These stock stories embody our deepest human, social and
political values. At the same time, they help us carry out the routine
activities of life without constantly having to analyze or question what
we are doing. When we face choices in life, stock stories help us
understand and decide; they also may disguise and distort. To solve a
problem through persuasion of another, we therefore must understand
and manipulate the stock stories the other person uses in order to tell
a plausible and compelling story--one that moves that person to grant
the remedy we want.
Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984)(citations
omitted).
55 Evidence that the Immigrant Tale is a story about the dominant American
culture is, of course, the fact of the slave trade. The story of African
Americans is not illuminated by the Immigrant’s Tale. Insofar as successful
assimilation by individuals and groups into the mainstream of American
society means internalizing the mainstream stories, African-Americans
would have to adopt a perspective that fundamentally denies their particular
history. This is, arguably, one more example of the “double-consciousness”
described by W.E.B Dubois. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, in
THREE NEGRO CLASSICS 214-15 (Avon Books 1965) (1903). It may also be an
important piece of the not-yet-solved problem of race in American society.
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The Immigrant must cross a boundary to reach the new home, and this
boundary crossing is fraught with some danger. In the traditional version,
the crucial boundary is the border surrounding the United States, and the
danger may be physical, but is more often political: i.e., rejection and
deportation. Thus, entering the United States through Ellis Island or by
crossing the Rio Grande River is a source of dramatic incidents in many
tellings of the Immigrant’s Tale.
Upon successful arrival, the Immigrant must create a new home. In
the traditional version, the Immigrant might eventually assimilate into
existing American communities. Or the Immigrant might join with other
Immigrants in creating a subcommunity that is contained within or must
interact with larger, already existing American communities.56 Or the
Immigrant might join with other Immigrants in creating self-contained and
self-sufficient communities.57
Two variations of the Immigrant contribute importantly to the selfdefinition of the United States. One is the Pilgrim. Pilgrims are among the
original foreign settlers in America who left their European homes, often in
response to religious persecution, to establish a new home on the North
American continent. The dangerous boundary that had to be traversed was
the Atlantic Ocean, and the communities founded by the Pilgrims were often
new and largely autarkic communities.

56
57

For example, the ethnic“neighborhoods” of many large American cities.
For example, the Amish communities in Ohio and Pennsylvania.
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The second important variation is the Pioneer. The Pioneer was
something of an internal Immigrant, who left an American home (typically in
the eastern part of the United States) and traveled west in search of
adventure, wealth, and so forth. The dangerous boundary separated the
civilization of the eastern United States from the unsettled wilderness of the
West. The new home might be one previously established by previous
Pioneers (Californian communities in many of these stories) or a brand new
home carved out of the wilderness.
It is important to note that stories about Immigrants, Pilgrims, and
Pioneers58 are largely tales about ordinary people. These are not the stories of
America’s heroes or larger-than-life villains; rather, they concern the
proletarians, merchants, farmers, ranchers, and adventurers who formed the
American polity and the various communities it comprises. In this sense, the
Immigrant is a peculiarly American character. It is not that other nations
have not had Immigrants; the point rather is that in most other countries the
Immigrant is an outsider who either remains an outsider or is absorbed into
the indigenous population. By contrast, America’s indigenous population,
native American Indians, has from the outset been cast in the role of
outsider. It is the newcomers, the Immigrants, who are regarded in the

58

In the remaining text, the terms “Immigrant” and “Immigrants” refer
alternatively to the traditional immigrants who come to the United States
from another country and to the collective group of Immigrants, Pilgrims, and
Pioneers. The particular contexts should make clear which meaning is being
employed.
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historical consciousness of the United States as the core population, and the
identities of these ordinary folks – as German-Americans,Chinese Americans, Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, Mexican-Americans, and the
like – are unavoidably linked to the old homes that they or their Immigrant
ancestors left.
What is noteworthy about the Immigrant story for our purposes is that
the acquisition of citizenship in a community and the assumption of the
political and social obligations that go with that citizenship are matters of
choice. The Immigrant chooses to leave home, to cross the dangerous
boundary, and to establish a new home. And thus the social obligations that
come with being a part of a community are a function of those choices.
This notion that individuals acquire social obligations by choice
contrasts with some of the most venerable political ideas in Western thought.
In Ancient Greek political theory, for example, individuals do not choose to be
part of a community. For Aristotle, a human being’s essential nature,
rationality, required political communities to flourish: “Man is by nature a
political animal.”59 Thus, humans do not choose to join communities; rather,
communities are necessary to become fully human.60
English political theory of the Enlightenment, on the other hand,
conceived of the moral justification for political society as resting on an

59

ARISTOTLE, POLITICA 1253a (Benjamin Jowett, trans., Random House 1947).
“The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual
is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing . . . .” Id.
60
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implicit contract.61 This contract, importantly, is a logical, not an historical
foundation. That is, the “agreement” described in the writings of Hobbes and
Locke that converted human society from a state of nature to a polity is
hypothetical and serves as a philosophical construct that confirms moral
legitimacy on the constraints imposed by civil society on the “natural rights”
of individuals. English political philosophy of the Enlightenment thereby
gives moral priority to the individual, in contrast with, say, Aristotelian
theory, which gives moral priority to the community.
On the other hand, American history is liberally sprinkled with actual
written agreements that defined the political contours of civil society: the
Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution,
among others. As well, membership is American society is generally
understood to be a matter of choice – not only for the
Immigrant/Pilgrim/Pioneer, but even for those who are born and remain
within the settled United States.62 Put another way, while social contract

61

The classic English texts explicating the social contract are THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL ch. 13-17 (Michael Oakeshott
ed., Collier Books 1962) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT passim (Thomas P. Peardon, ed., The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.
1952) (1690).
62 The traditional American label for the integration of an individual into a
particular political community is citizenship or domicile. As the
Restatement(Second) of Conflict of Laws indicates, while everyone has a
“domicil of origin” at birth, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14
(1969), a “domicil of choice may be acquired by a person who is legally
capable of changing his domicil.” Id. § 15. The two requirements of
establishing such a “domicil of choice” is understood to be within the control
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theory gives priority to the individual as an abstract proposition, American
political theory continues to regard the relationship of each actual individual
and the community as anchored in choice. The obligations I have to the
United States and to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to the City of
Philadelphia can all be traced back to my choices; conversely, in the absence
of the requisite choices, I would be to a remarkable degree insulated from
political duties.
The idea of choice, which is central to the Immigrant Tale, has several
elements. The first of these is intentionality. The leaving of the old home to
establish the new one is purposeful. The crossing of the dangerous boundary
emphasizes this aspect of the Immigrant’s voyage by showing that for the
Immigrant,the establishment of a new home entails risks knowingly
incurred.63
A second element is the exercise of control through human
perseverance and ingenuity. The Immigrant, the Pilgrim, and the Pioneer
generally arrive at the destination with few material resources and must set
about subduing a hostile environment. Whether that environment is the

of the individual. The first of these requirements is physical presence in the
chosen place. Id. §§ 15, 16. However, presence “under physical or legal
compulsion” does not satisfy this requirement. Id. § 17. The second
requirement is the subjective intention “to make that place his home for the
time at least.” Id. § 18.
My colleague Craig Green observes that this traditional identification of
domicile with individual choice is reflected in the slogan: “America – Love it
or leave it!”
63 But see supra note 55.
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indifferent urbanism of Manhattan or the hostile wilderness of Plymouth
Rock or the Great Plains, the Immigrant must use judgment, skill, and hard
work to survive and flourish.
This emphasis on gaining control over the Immigrant’s environment,
in turn, implicates the third element: action. The tradition of Western
European theorizing on human mastery over the world has emphasized two
primary modes of exercising control. The most ancient is the invocation of
divine assistance;64 the second is the exercise of human reason.65 While
various stories of Immigrants, Pioneers, and especially Pilgrims might have
their spiritual dimensions, these accounts are not primarily about religion or
reason; they are largely about action – vigorous, sometimes heroic activity
that overcomes the obstacles and creates the new home.
The Immigrant Tale, therefore, is a narrative in which the individual’s
place in the world is not determined by the ordering of reason, deities, class,
fortune, and so forth; rather, the individualaffirmatively makes his or her

64

The Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) is replete with well-known examples of
this tradition – for instance, Joshua 10:12-13:
On the day the Lord gave the Amorites over to Israel, Joshua said to
the Lord in the presence of Israel: "O sun, stand still over Gibeon, O
moon, over the Valley of Aijalon." So the sun stood still, and the moon
stopped, till the nation avenged itself on its enemies, as it is written in
the Book of Jashar. The sun stopped in the middle of the sky and
delayed going down about a full day.
65 In the West, this tradition dates back to the Ionian philosophers in the
sixth and fifth centuries B.C. and continues through to the science of today.
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place. By attributing success to active, hard work, the story is one of earned
prosperity. It is, in short, a story redolent of traditional American values.66

IV
The Action Bias in American Law (Part 2)
The bias toward predicating legal obligations on active rather than
passive conduct reflects the values central to the Immigrant story. In general
terms, that story is about participation in a political community. The
individual joins or creates a political community through intentional action
that has as its goal mastering the environment to createa home.
If community affiliation is a function of individual choice, then we
might think that legal obligations are triggered by intentional affiliating
action. That is, by choosing to affiliate with a political community, we assume
legal duties toward that community and toward its members. They are, as it
were, the quid pro quo for the benefits of this chosen affiliation.
The action bias translates this general point into the definition of
particular legal duties. By actively inserting ourselves into the community,
we presumptively take on particular obligations appropriate to that action.
Conversely, when we remain passive with respect to the community, we are
presumptively free of obligation. Put another way, when we choose to interact
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For a discussion of the work of novelist Horatio Alger, whose novels
illustrated a belief in the power of individual character to overcome adversity
see Stefan Kanfer, Horatio Alger: The Moral of the Story (visited 2/18/06)
http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_4_urbanities-the_moral.html.
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with the community, that interaction will be governed by law that imposes
limits on and, thus, potential liability for our conduct; however, when we
choose not to interact, the law imposes little or no liability for the
consequences of that passivity.67
Consider once again homicide as paradigmatic of the action bias. You
will recall the example: If I fail to rescue an unconscious eleven-year-old
stranger from a shallow pool of water, I am presumptively not criminally
liable when she subsequently drowns. On the other hand, if the person in the
water is my eleven-year-old daughter, I would be liable for her death. The
difference is that the law has “otherwise imposed” on me a duty to care for
my daughter, whereas it has not done so for the stranger. By contrast, if I act
affirmatively to kill another – by shooting, stabbing, poisoning, drowning, etc
– I am presumptively liable for that person’s death, irrespective of whether
the victim is a stranger or my daughter.
My shooting of a person is an action that reveals my intention both
with regard to the act of shooting and its socially unacceptable consequences

67

As noted earlier, the Immigrant’s Tale is a story that resonates with the
histories of certain groups, but not to others, including African Americans
and Native American Indians. See supra note 55 and text accompanying note
58. Accordingly, the centrality of action in determining one’s legal rights and
obligation associates the action bias with dominant groups, precisely the
groups most able to shape the law. Put bluntly, at various points in our
history, African Americans, Native Americans, women, and others have been
disabled from determining their legal identities through the active assertion
of will; in fact, those identities have been largely imposed against their will
by the prevailing legal regime (e.g., slave codes, “treaties” with the Indian
Nations, coverture, the World War II internment of Japanese Americans
living on the west coast of the United States).
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(whether what is intended is killing, wounding, or frightening). Moreover, it
reflects an attempt to aggressively gain control over another through
violence. By contrast, my passive behavior of refusing to rescue the drowning
stranger asserts no control over another. Moreover, my intention expressed
through this behavior is clear with regard to the refusal, but ambiguous with
regard to the consequences of that refusal. (Is harm intended, or do I just
want to avoid getting involved, or am I trying to get somewhere in a hurry?)
We can look at this from a somewhat different perspective. The
Immigrant’s story is about leaving home, crossing a dangerous boundary, and
establishing a new home through one’s active conduct; that is to say, it is a
story about altering the status quo. Of the various homicides described above,
my passive behavior of refusing to rescue a stranger, insofar as my
unambiguous intentions are concerned, maintains the status quo, whereas
my shooting of anyone alters the status quo. Similarly, my adoption of the
eleven-year-old stranger would intentionally alter the status quo. My legal
duty to refrain from deadly conduct tracks this point: Conduct that alters the
status quo leads to liability for resulting death; by contrast, conduct that
leaves the status quo in place does not support criminal liability, even if
death results.
In sum, the Immigrant’s story is a narrative about dramatic,
intentional, status quo-altering behavior. More specifically, it is a narrative
about acting to insert oneself into a new political community or to create such
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a community. The action bias predicates legal duties on intentional, status
quo-altering behavior.More specifically, the action bias predicates certain
legal duties on affirmative acts of affiliation with a political community.
Among this set of legal duties is that of submission to the jurisdiction of the
community’s courts. That is the thrust of personal jurisdiction doctrine as
traditionally understood, and that is the thrust of the “sliding scale” test of
Zippo Dot Com.

V
The Triumph of Zippo Dot Com (Part 2)
In the Immigrant’s Tale, the individual joins or creates a political
community through intentional action. This intentional affiliating action, in
turn, triggers legal obligations. That is, by choosing to affiliate with a
political community, we assume legal duties toward that community and
toward its members. Among these legal duties is that of submission to the
jurisdiction of the community’s courts.
We see in the traditional understanding of personal jurisdiction
doctrine all the key features of this narrative and the consequent action bias
in American law. Consider the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Hanson v.
Denckla:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
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the forum State. . . . [I]t is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.68
Here are requirements that defendantaffiliate with the forum (“invoking the
benefits and protections of [the forum’s] laws”), that the affiliating conduct be
intentional (“purposeful avail[ment]”), and that the affiliating conduct be
active (“conducting activities”). Moreover, we see that an important reason
for requiring intentional and active affiliating conduct is to establish that
defendant (not others) be in control of the affiliating contacts (“unilateral
activity of [others] cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State”).69 This assertion of control by means of intentional action confers on
defendant’s contacts with the forum a quality that makes the forum’s
assertion of jurisdiction over defendant consistent with “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”

68

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
The centrality of control in is emphasized by two wrinkles in the
traditional doctrine of presence. The “minimum contacts” test is itself derived
by analogy from the older doctrine of presence: that a court presumptively
has jurisdiction over a defendant who is present within the forum state. See,
International Shoe, 326 U.S at 318; see also, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877). However, courts have developed two important exceptions to the
sufficiency of presence: Jurisdiction will not be asserted by a court when
defendant’s presence within the jurisdiction as the result of duress, see, e.g.,
Croucher v. Croucher, 200 N.E.2d 854 (Ill. Ct. App. 1964), or fraud, see, e.g.,
Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 Fed. 700 (2d Cir. 1917). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 82 (1969). That is, when
defendant’s affiliation with the forum is not voluntary – not fully within the
control of defendant – the affiliating contacts will not support jurisdiction.
69
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And while fairness would obviously support jurisdiction over claims
arising out of those specific contacts,70 a defendant whose affiliating activities
are “continuous” and “substantial” might well be subject to jurisdiction “on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities.”71 This distinction within personal jurisdiction doctrine between
“specific” and “general” jurisdiction72 both underscores and adds nuance to
the idea that legal obligations arise out of intentional affiliations with a
political community. Different kinds of contacts with the forum indicate
different levels of intended affiliation. Someone driving through a state seems
to intend a highly transient affiliation, while someone operating a business
within a state expresses the intention to become an enduring and integral
part of the community.73
We can now see why the “sliding scale” test ofZippo Dot Com might
have wide appeal among courts considering the constitutional limits on
personal jurisdiction in cases arising out of Internet activities: It resonates
exquisitely with the action bias.
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International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
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The court’s articulation of the test focuses on the two ends of the scale.
At one end is the “passive Web site that does little more than make
information available to those who are interested in it.” 74 Such a site, the
court tells us “is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”75 Why
not? Because we are looking for action on the part of defendant in affiliating
with the forum. Defendant must have “reached out” and thereby “originated
and maintained contacts” with the forum for jurisdiction to be permissible. 76
The passive site does not involve such reaching out. On the contrary, the
contacts with the forum are initiated by forum Internet users who access
defendant’s Web site. This “unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State.”77 That is, characterizing defendant’s Web site
as “passive” indicates defendant’s lack of control over who accesses the site
and, consequently and, therefore, over what states are impacted by the
information contained on the site.
Jack’s Web site is passive in this sense, and accordingly it might seem
odd to conclude that Jack has “purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege
of conducting activities” in North Dakota simply because Colbyand Brie and,
perhaps, others in that state had connected to his Web site. Notwithstanding
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the appreciable effects that Jack’s Web page had in North Dakota, the fact is
that he has little control over from whom and, more to the point, from where
his page is accessed. Seen through the lens of the action bias, this lack of
control over the contacts that connect defendant to the forum subverts the
justification for imposing a legal obligation of submission to the jurisdiction of
the forum’s courts.
At the other end of the sliding scale we find “situations where a
defendant clearly does business over the Internet.” Through such Web sites,
defendant engages in specific transactions with a specific individual located
in a specific state. Here we seem to have the kind of intentional and active
affiliation with the forum demanded by the action bias. In such instances,
“[i]f the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer
files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper.”78
Of course, this analysis avoids coming to grip with what we have seen
to be a characteristic quality of the Internet is precisely that it enables
individuals to transact with one another without either knowing where the
other is geographically located. In short, the geographic indeterminacy
discussed earlier applies just as much to interactive sites as to passive sites.
Consider, for example, a Web-based commercial transaction: say, the
purchase on-line of a computer from a New York retailer by a North Dakota
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customer. The exchange of information between the customer and the
computer seller’s Web site will likely involve no human being besides the
customer. The location of the server on which the seller’s Web site is stored
will likely be unknown to the consumer. The geographical location of the
consumer (the eventual forum) will likely be unknown to any human being in
the seller’s company until the order has been placed. It is certainly the case
that the subsequent sending of the computer to the forum state will be
responsive to the customer’s initial contact; however, a defendant’s activity
directed toward the forum in response to contacts initiated by someone other
than defendant has been held not to be indicative of the “purposeful
avail[ment] . . . of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state”
required to support personal jurisdiction.79 And yet, the Ninth Circuit, for
instance, found that such Web-based retail transactions supplied a predicate
for asserting jurisdiction under the “sliding scale” test.80
Hence, the triumph of Zippo Dot Com’s “sliding scale” test is difficult to
justify analytically in the sense that the test fails to address the peculiarities
of the Internet that render problematic the traditional territorialist
underpinnings of personal jurisdiction doctrine. Moreover, it is difficult to
justify in terms of policy. Why should conduct that has identifiable harmful
effects within a jurisdiction escape adjudication by the courts of that state?
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Why should a lack of intentional connection with the territory of the forum
count against jurisdiction when activities in cyberspace are by their very
nature territorially indeterminate? The continued dominance of the “sliding
scale” test suggests the power of the action bias over such analytical and
policy concerns.

VI
Postscript: The Sovereign’s Tale
The Immigrant’s Tale can itself be subsumed under a larger narrative,
epitomized by the motto on the Great Seal of the United States: “e pluribus
unum.” The conventional story of America includes the idea that it is a whole
formed by the coming together of many individual pieces. The Immigrant’s
story is one aspect of that notion. Americans often refer to their country as “a
nation of immigrants.” The idea is that true Americans (or the ancestors of
true Americans) come from elsewhere, having left their homes to create new
homes in America. (Again, it is, for this reason, not surprising that the only
Americans who are actually native – who are not immigrants or their
descendants – have been perpetual political and cultural outsiders
throughout the nation’s history.) This understanding that we are “one”
formed by the coming together of “many” is a source for the continuous
tension between a vision of America in which the identity of each individual
in terms of that former home is preserved and celebrated (the phenomenon of
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the hyphenated American) and a vision of America as a “melting pot,” in
which the individual, immigrant identities dissolve into a homogeneous
American unity.
A second aspect of “e pluribus unum” might be called the “Sovereign’s
Tale.” It is a political story of a single nation being formed out of individuated
sovereignties – the states – which retain aspects of their original sovereignty.
This story not only depicts a powerful, sometimes violent tension between
state and national authority, but describes a complex and problematic
relationship among the states themselves, as they seek to accommodate their
simultaneous independence and interdependence.
The impact of this story on the development of personal jurisdiction is
central to the most famous decision in that doctrine’s history: Pennoyer v.
Neff.81 That case invalidated Oregon’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over
an individual located and domiciled in California. The Supreme Court’s
rationale was nicely summarized a century later:
Mr. Justice Field's opinion for the Court focused on the
territorial limits of the States’ judicial powers. Although recognizing
that the States are not truly independent sovereigns, Mr. Justice Field
found that their jurisdiction was defined by the principles of “public
law” that regulate the relationships among independent nations. The
first of those principles was “that every State possesses exclusive
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jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory.” The second was “that no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory.” . . .Thus, “in virtue of the State’s jurisdiction over the
property of the non-resident situated within its limits,” the state courts
“can inquire into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens . . .
to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property.” . . .
The Court recognized that if the conclusions of that inquiry were
adverse to the non-resident property owner, his interest in the
property would be affected. . . . Similarly, if the defendant consented to
the jurisdiction of the state courts or was personally served within the
State, a judgment could affect his interest in property outside the
State. But any attempt “directly” to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction
over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the
inherent limits of the State’s power.82
Pennoyer anchored its analysis in federalism principles, rather than in
due process, for the simple reason that the fourteenth amendment’s due
process clause was not yet in effect at the time of the juridical events being
challenged in the case. Nonetheless, dicta in the case suggested that the
extra-territorial assertion of jurisdiction would violate due process norms,83
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and subsequent personal jurisdiction cases seemed to focus exclusively on
that clause.
Since the 1945 decision in International Shoe with its emphasis on
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” the Court’s
pronouncements on the status of Pennoyer‘s state sovereignty rationale have
been, to put it mildly, inconsistent. A decade after International Shoe the
Court asserted in Hanson v. Deckla that
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts . . . are more
than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.
They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he
has had the ‘minimal contacts’ with that State that are a prerequisite
to its exercise of power over him.84
But in 1977 the Court suggested in Shaffer v. Heitner that with the decision
in International Shoe,
the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,
rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which
the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry
into personal jurisdiction.85
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Three years later, the Court seemed committed to accommodating both
dimensions of the doctrine, insisting in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson
that
[the ‘minimum contacts’ test] can be seen to perform two related, but
distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the
burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to
ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach out beyond
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system.86
The following year came another flip-flop, with the Court declaring that
modern personal jurisdiction cases, including World-Wide Volkswagen, are
concerned exclusively with due process and not with the relationship among
states.87 And yet, three years after that, the Court applied the “minimum
contacts” test by means of a multi-factor analysis that included consideration
of “the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies” and the “shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”88
This back-and-forth on the role of state sovereignty in defining the
constitutional limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction89 should not
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surprise us. Just as the Immigrant’s Tale is a source of the tension between
the “hyphenated American” and the “melting pot” visions of the United
States, the Sovereign’s Tale generates its own tension between states’ rights
and national unity. And just as the explicitly invoked due process clause
encapsulates th
e tension of the Immigrant’s Tale,so the shadow -clause of the
personal jurisdiction cases – the full faith and credit clause – embraces the
political tension of the Sovereign’s Tale.90
Moreover, as the Immigrant’s Tale illuminates the action bias in
American law and the instantiation of that bias in the popular “sliding scale”
test for personal jurisdiction, so we might expect the Sovereign’s Tale, as a
reflection of fundamentally important political values, to cast its own light on
the seemingly inevitable triumph ofZippo Dot Com.

exclusively in terms of due process. The natural constitutional home for a
discussion of the federalism dimension is the full faith and credit clause. U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.”)
See Richard K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal
Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 HAST. L.J. 855, 860-61 (1987). In contrast to the
courts’ treatment of personal jurisdiction, analysis of the constitutional limits
on choice of law has historically invoked both of these clauses, thereby
providing a vocabulary on which to distinguish fairness considerations from
those having to do with relations among the states. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick
, 281 U.S. 397 (1930)(decided under the due process clause); Bradford
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932)(decided under the full faith
and credit clause); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964)(decided
under both the due process and full faith and credit clauses). In recent times,
the United States Supreme Court has conflated the two inquiries so as to
dampen the value of these distinct vocabularies. See Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Justice Steven’s concurring opinion focuses on
just this problem. Id. at 320-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90 See discussion in supra note 89.
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Again, my interest is not to debate whether thinking about sovereignty
in the context of Internet activity makes sense, 91 any more than I am
concerned with whether the action bias makes sense in that context. I want
to simply suggest that an analogue to the action bias can be found in what
might be called the “territory mystique.” The idea that our states are
analogous to nations and that state borders consequently matter pervades
the law. In personal jurisdiction doctrine, the mystique most clearly
manifests itself in the “minimum contacts” test.
Put simply, “minimum contacts” have no necessary relationship to the
fundamental fairness required by the due process clause.92 One can easily
depict situations in which requiring a party to litigate in a jurisdiction with
which that individual has no contacts, minimum or otherwise, is in no way
unfair. Why, then, require contacts between the party and the forum
? The
answer appears to be a residual territorialism left over from the pre-due
process days of Pennoyer v. Neff. An important source of that residue is the
territory mystique, and the background story is the Sovereign’s Tale.
This residual territorialism does not require the intentionality and
control that are hallmarks of the action bias. At its most extreme, the
territory mystique can even overwhelm the action bias in personal
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jurisdiction doctrine and support jurisdiction when no intentional contact
with the forum exists. Thus, for instance,a party has been held subject to the
jurisdiction of a state by being served with process while flying over that
state as a passenger on a commercial airplane.93
Rather, what the territory mystiquerequires is some activity that
connects the individual with the geographic territory of the state. Such
activities may include the individual’s physical presence within the state’s
borders at the moment that the court asserts its power through service of
process (the Pennoyer paradigm), past activity of the individual within the
state that generates the claim before the court (the International Shoe
paradigm), and some status or past activity that integrates the individual
into the state’s political community (citizenship/domicile being
paradigmatic).94 A somewhat late development in personal jurisdiction
doctrine constitutes a fourth kind ofsufficient contact with the forum:
activity beyond the state’s territorial borders that causes harmful effects
within the borders of the state.95
Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, for the last of these –
projecting harmful effects into the state – to support personal jurisdiction, it
helps that the conduct producing the harm has been “expressly aimed” at the
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forum.96 The Sovereign’s Tale helps us make sense of this. If states are
analogous to nations, then when Nation A’s territory suffers harm as the
result of the activities of Nation B outside of A’s borders, we might expect as
a matter of diplomacy that A would discriminate between harm that was
inadvertent (say, B’s communication satellite falls to earth and lands in A)
and harm that was “expressly aimed” at A by B (say, B lobs a ballistic missile
at A). Among American states these diplomatic expectations of comity and
mutual accommodation are constitutionalized through the requirement of full
faith and credit. In the context of personal jurisdiction, then, the farther
defendant’s contacts with the forum stray from the Pennoyer paradigm of
physical presence, the weaker the apparent influence of the territory
mystique and the stronger the demands of the action bias (including
intentionality and control).
Jack’s defamatory Web page caused harmful effects inside North
Dakota through activity outside that state. The territory mystiqueshould be
weak in such a situation, thereby requiring that Jack’s defamation be
“expressly aimed” at North Dakota in order to justify North Dakota
jurisdiction. Zippo Dot Com‘s “sliding scale” test discriminates between
passive and interactive sites in just this way, requiring the court to ask
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whether Jack’s site was “passive” (i.e., not directed toward any particular
geographic place) or “interactive” (i.e., actively engaged with persons located
at identifiable places).

Conclusion
Law is a rhetorical art; the central task of lawyers is to persuade. One
way of thinking about what makes a doctrinal argument persuasive is to look
at how debates surrounding difficult questions of law have stabilized and
been resolved by courts over time. And looking at the career of Zippo Dot
Com suggests that one thing that might make a particular argument
persuasive is its resonance with our collective aspirations.
If we think of ourselves as a nation of immigrants and, more generally,
of a nation in which individual initiative counts for both merit and blame,
then a doctrine of personal jurisdiction that emphasizes defendant’s
intentional and active affiliation with the forum might seem a more fitting
test than one which predicates jurisdiction on the chance occurrence of
deleterious effects within the forum. And if we think of ourselves as a nation
of states – distinct political entities defined by their geographic borders –
then a doctrine of personal jurisdiction that seeks to capture extraterritorial
behavior aimed at causing harm inside the forum’s borders might seem
similarly attractive.
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Looking through these lenses of the action bias and the territory
mystique, a North Dakota court might easily conclude that Jack’s particular
harm
- causing conduct fails to connect directly with North Dakota’s
community concerns. If so, Brie’s argument will fail to persuade, and Jack
will escape the long-arm jurisdiction of the court.
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